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THE LEGAL MEANING OF iNSANITY 
FR. ANDREW CUSCHIERI, O.F.M. 
A satisfactory legal definition of 
insanity has not yet been provided, and 
with our present knowledge, the chances 
are undeniably against any attempt at pro-
viding one being successful. 
Even a little knowledge of psychiatry 
is enough to show how astonishingly diffi-
cult it is to decide on the imputability of 
a person suffering from a psychological 
disorder. The question whether a demar-
cation line can possibly be drawn between 
the sane and the insane no longer deserves 
consideration. Suffice it to say that it is 
commonly understood, in medico-psychiat-
ric circles, that no one enjoys complete 
psychological integrity. Mental illness may 
rightly be referred to as the caricature of 
the patient's psychological make-up. On 
this assumption is based the common be-
lief that between the seemingly normal 
and the inmates of mental hospitals only 
a distinction of degree can be granted. In 
spite of this it is clear that on theoretical 
grounds, and also for practical reasons, 
we cannot ignore a vague distinction 
between the sound and the unsound, as 
between the sick and the dying, or between 
poverty and misery. Although quite akin 
to each other, there is a substantial cleav-
age, dividing two distinct patterns. 
This helps us to understand why 
psychiatry has so far been unable to give 
a satisfactory definition of insanity, and 
more implications are to be found in the 
issue. In our attempts at a definition, the 
fundamental classification of mental dis-
orders into psychoses and psychoneuroses, 
endogenous and exogenous disorders, 
functional and organic reaction types, is 
liable to create difficulties. 
The difficulty of diagnosis together with 
the intensity of the illness changing from 
one case to the other, complicate the issue 
further. The problem promises even poorer 
outcome, since in the majority of cases the 
intrinsic nature of the illness is as yet 
unknown. It will be apparent, therefore, 
why the psychiatrist speaks more in terms 
of syndromes than of proper specific cli-
nical entities, and hence any classification 
based on present standards of knowledge 
is bound to be arbitrary. It is only in cases 
of subnormality, otherwise known as men-
tal deficiency, that one can find clear-cut 
distinctions, and consequently get a rigid 
classification. One wonders if psychiatry 
can ever succeed in giving a definition. 
Nature has fixed no 4 rules and rigid classi-
fications; it is man who tries to fix them. 
Taking up the concept of mental nor-
mality again, mention must be made of 
the fact that it is and has always been con-
ditioned by two factors, namely, era and 
environment. Thus going back in time, 
Roman Law decided against the validity 
in toto of the juridical act of a person who, 
in his last will, had expressed the wish to 
be buried at sea (L. 27, in Digesta, 28, 7). 
The nullity of the juridical act was decided 
on the grounds that the inclusion of such 
a clause was a clear indication of unsound-
ness of mind. At the present day such a 
request is given a more benign interpreta-
tion, being accepted as fairly normal. Pre-
sent-day law therefore would see to the 
accomplishment of the enactments as the 
last wish of a sound mind. Modern poetry 
and ultra modern paintings, which usually 
suggest schizophrenic autism, would in all 
probability have furnished proof of un-
soundness of mind to people like Mascar-
dus and Menochius. The intellectually bril-
liant usually shares the same fate, for 
through his genius he enjoys degrees of 
insight and foresight by far superior to 
those of his fellow men. He may eventual-
ly be spoken of as indulging a personal 
obsession. The life of Leonardo da Vinci 
is a typical case. 
How environment and customs con-
stitute another important delimitating fac-
tor is easily seen from the following simple 
example. If a European girl were to apply 
the facial paintings commonly used by 
Australian aborigines, one would be justi-
fied in considering her as showing the pro-
dromal signs of mental disorder. 
As far as we are concerned the two 
above premises enable us to envisage the 
difficulty in establishing who is of sound 
mind and who is not. Each generation dif-
fers from its previous and subsequent ones 
in many issues, but mostly in its psycholo-
gical make-up. In racial and national di-
vergencies the psychological setting plays 
also an important part. In spite of all dis-
crimination, however, there is no reason 
why men of different era and environment 
should not be included within the pale of 
mental normality. 
If psychiatry were in a position to 
furnish us with a definition satisfactory 
for its own requirements, it would never-
theless fail to comply with legal demands. 
The queries which the psychiatrist and the 
jurist raise stand poles apart. The psy-
chiatrist concerns himself exclusively with 
the clinical aspect of the illness. The study 
of the etiology, morphology and sympto-
matology together with the course and 
prognosis of the mental illness provides 
for the psychiatrist the main topic of 
inquiry. Secondly, therapeutic and precau-
tionary measures are equal and important 
concerns of the medical profession. But 
the question whether the patient is res-
ponsible for his action, falls outside the 
limits of the medical profession. 
The duties of the judge and the jury 
are precisely and exclusively circumscribed 
by the following question: whether a deter-
mined act, which apparently seems the 
output of a sound mind should be held as 
the result of deliberation (actus humanus), 
or merely an act which took place without 
deliberation (actio hominis) as the result 
of mental deficiency or was provoked by 
a mental disorder. In other words, in a 
determined case of mental deficiency or 
psychic disorder, what stand should be 
taken regarding the imputability of the 
patient for the act or acts with which he 
is charged? Under the focal light of this 
premise should be formulated the essence 
of what we mean by insanity in legal terms. 
Needless therefore to say an ex protesso 
(Le. a specialist's) knowledge of the dif-
ferent mental disorders is of secondary 
importance to the jurist. 
While the psychiatrist would be satis-
fied if he reaches a diagnosis, this would 
be merely a starting point for further 
inquiry in law. The precise psychiatric 
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diagnosis may have very limited bearing 
upon the juridical question of imputabi-
lity. "Often the psychiatrist learns too late 
that the existence of psychosis as such at 
the time of the offence does not automa-
tically exempt the offender from punish-
ment" (Cavanagh J. R. and McGoldrick 
J. B., 1963). Psychoneurosis may well be 
responsible for reducing or even abolish-
ing the imputability of the patient, as much 
as psychosis does. Psychosis, however, 
does not necessarily imply absence of im-
putability. Strange as it may seem, the 
Sacred Roman Rota declared null and void 
a marriage contract one of the parties to 
which suffered from psychoneurosis at the 
time of the wedding (S.R.R. Decis.), while 
in cases of psychosis it was declared other-
wise (S.R.R. Decis.). Indeed the fact ap-
pears quite awkward even to the psychia-
trist, since psychosis forms a more serious 
illness than psychoneurosis. The .clinical 
picture, therefore, does not of its own ap-
peal to the jurist, as much as it does to 
the medical doctor, except for secondary 
reasons. Mental disorder, whether it be 
psychosis or psychoneurosis, does not bv 
its own nature deprive the patient of hi"s 
consensus, although in cases of psychosis 
the possibilities of its doing so are great-
er. It is commonly understood, moreover, 
that the same type of illness differs from 
one case to another in intensity; it may 
even intensify gradually, and only after 
many years may reach such a degree as to 
make the patient lose control of his men-
tal faculties. It was for this reason that 
the Roman Rota Decision coram Florczak 
states: "Inability to reason cannot be sim-
ply deduced from the mere diagnosis of 
the illness - however perfect this diagno-
sis may be (S.R.R. Decis.). Having thus 
established the diagnosis, the examination 
of the patient, which will decide on his 
responsibility for his actions, lies in the 
hands of the jury. 
Recognising the duties of the judge 
one can also envisage the basic legal mean-
ing of insanity. The absence of the con-
sensus should constitute the essence of the 
juridical concept of insanity. Roman law 
furnishes us with a well known axiom: 
"Furiosi nulla voluntas est" (L. 40, in 
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Digesta, 50, 17; 1.47, 29, 2), which was 
later accepted by the Church in its pasto-
ral and juridical proceedings. The famous 
reply by Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) to 
the Bishop and Chapter of Targilensis tes-
tifies to this. A certain priest joined the 
monastic life while he was out of his 
senses and had lost all hope of recovery. 
It was proposed to the Pontiff that the said 
priest was not bound to the monastic Rule 
after he had recovered from his illness. It 
appeared however contradictory to the 
Pope that a person who is out of his sen-
ses, can despair of the present life. The 
reply of the Pope maintains that a person 
is responsible for his acts if he exercises 
the power of deliberation (c. Sicut tenor, 
15, X, Ill, 31). Ancient literature, both civil 
and ecclesiastical, has not failed to adhere 
to this teaching. One may eventually en-
counter similar phrases, such as: "The 
presence of turor involves a gradual re-
gression of intellectual capacity" (Ab Assi-
sio Josephus Ludovicus). "A man affected 
by turor is deprived of intellectual power 
- of thinking, judging and reasoning, and 
the free exercise of his will" (Socinus Bar-
tholomaeus, 1571); "When turor is ;acute 
and the whole individual is wholly excited 
then mental blindness takes possession of 
him" (Menochius, 1636); "Furor affects the 
mind of man to such an extent that he 
cannot discern the true nature of things" 
(Colerius Matthia, 1612) .. 
A full understanding of insanity from 
the legal point of view presupposes a basic 
knowledge of psychology and psychiatry. 
It is not simply the absence of the delibe-
rative faculty that makes a person juridi-
cally insane. For a person to be considered 
insane there must be a definite identifiable 
abnormality. Canon law presumes (which 
is a praesumptio iuris et de iure) a normal 
six-year-old child to be lacking in the deli-
berative faculty. This, however, should not 
mean that the child is insane. It is under-
standable, therefore, that the study of psy-
chology and psychiatry should be impor-
tant for establishing the correct meaning 
of insanity. 
Assuming the Freudian doctrine that 
free will is but an illusion to be correct, 
modern psychiatry has shown a marked 
tendency to limit seriously or even to deny 
freedom of action in man. It is on this 
assumption that present-day psychiatry 
recognizes crime as a disease. Such an 
assertion would have serious repercussions 
on society at large, and for this reason 
the law has eyed the infiltration of Freu-
dian doctrine warily as disastrous to so-
cial order. In spite of many opinions 
cherished by the followers of Freud, no 
one can fail to recognize the existence of 
human freedom and its importance in all 
spheres of human activity. 
We all act on the assumption that a 
person is endowed with the deliberative 
faculty which permits him to act or not 
to act. This freedom forms the basic cri-
terion for legal responsibility. Nature has 
granted human beings the faculty of choos-
ing between different possibilities of action 
- a power commonly known as psycholo-
gical freedom. Upon this freedom is based 
our ability to choose between right and 
wrong (Zavalloni, 1956). This freedom 
forms, therefore, the axis on which turn 
the ethical principles of the individual per-
son and those of society. Good or evil 
before God and society will be rewarded 
or otherwise punished in virtue of this 
natural endowment of man. 
The question of psychological freedom 
presents more implications in cases of 
insanity. In many instances the patient 
seems to act according to his wits, and he 
may appear quite conscious of his actions, 
but we will later find that we have been 
cheated by the patient's apparent psycho-
logical consciousness. But this is a prac-
tical question which should not detain us 
in our pursuit. Once we have laid down 
the fundamental principle of human acti-
vity, we are likely to learn the meaning of 
insanity as understood by law. 
For further understanding of the legal 
concept of insanity it seems useful to 
examine the McNaghten Rules. To escape 
imputability for a crime it was stated that 
the individual must prove that, at the time 
of the crime, he was: 
1. suffering from such a defect of 
reason from mental disease 
2. as not to know the nature and 
quality of his act; 
3. or if he did, he did not know that 
the act was wrong. 
If the words "mental disease" were 
to be taken as they are understood in 
medicine, the McNaghten formula would 
offer great difficulties in forensic circles, 
and would allow slender chances for a plea 
of not guilty owing to insanity. In very 
few psychiatric cases could we speak of 
disease. It is well known in psychiatry 
that psychosis is not a disease in the sense 
that it is always characterized by patho-
logical lesions. The dementias may fitting-
ly fall under this heading, but the onset 
of a great number of psychoneuroses and 
psychoses cannot be attributed to a speci-
fic cause. The terms "mental disorder", 
"disordered psychology" etc. may well fit 
the facts. 
Another difficulty which follows from 
the formula concerns the terms "nature 
and quality of the act". It is not clear 
enough what the formula means by "qua-
lity". Following various court decisions 
the term "quality" seems to mean "conse-
quences". Whatever meaning it may sug-
gest, the term seems superfluous and helps 
to render the issue more complicated. 
Once a person is known to have acquired 
a true understanding of his action, a priori 
he acknowledges the qualities and the con-
sequences thereof. Both factors form the 
elementa constitutiva of the human act, 
without which we can only speak of the 
actio hominis. The consequences, which 
the McNaghten formula refers to, stand for 
those results which necessarily flow from 
the essence of the human act. To know the 
"nature of the act", therefore, means to 
know its qualities and consequences. 
It is in this regard too that the final 
clause of the formula should be dropped: 
"or if he did (know the nature and quality 
of the act), he did not know that the act 
was wrong". It appears quite contradic-
tory that a person who does not know 
that the act is wrong, can understand the 
nature of his act, or viceversa. If he had 
no knowledge of the wrongfulness of his 
act, it means that he had not comprehend-
ed the nature of his act; one intrinsically 
includes the other. To know the nature of 
the act means to know not only the fact 
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as such, which also a beast may compre-
. hend, but also to understand that the act 
is right or wrong. 
In view of what has been said so far, 
by insanity in the legal sense we mean: a 
condition of mind caused by underdevelop-
ment of intelligence or by any psycho-
somatic, or by merely psychic disorder of 
such a degree as to render the person 
unable to choose between different possi-
bilities of action. 
From this formula two difficulties 
may arise. The first regards the inclusion 
of mental deficiency in the legal concept 
of insanity. Psychiatry stubbornly main-
tains that the question is closed. Full cre-
dit is given to the statement laid down by 
Esquirol that between mental deficiency 
and mental illness there is a great differ-
ence (Esquirol, 1846). English law has 
worked out a meaning for mental defi-
ciency which could never satisfy modern 
standards of psychiatry. It simply confu-
ses the issue and puts the jurist and the 
psychiatrist in complete disagreement. 
Although it seems presumptuous to re-
quire that mental deficiency be inserted 
in the formula, there are on the other hand 
sound reasons why it should. Every pro-
fession has its specific pursuit with an aim 
intrinsically in accord with the nature of 
the profession: "The attainment of an aim 
is the main motive of every action" goes 
the axiom. It is outside the "aim" of the 
legal profession to diagnose the illness of 
the person in the dock. If it is desirable 
for the judge to study psychiatry, the fact 
still holds true that the establishment of 
the diagnosis in law is of secondary and 
preparatory nature in the attainment of 
the final decision. The primal and exclu-
sive question to be answered in court is 
whether the person was responsible for 
his actions. In this respect it is reasonable 
that the law should consider both the sub-
normal and the abnormal alike. 
The formula, moreover, as laid down 
by the present writer fails to recognize 
the question of the "irresistible impulse". 
This is absolutely true. It has often been 
seriously doubted whether will power has 
really been called into action in cases of 
yielding to a so-called irresistible impulse. 
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If this were the case, the "irresistible 
impulse" would hold the full import of the 
"actus humanus". But if it is convincingly 
shown that the distortion is not only of 
the will, but of the whole person thus pre-
venting the exercise of reason, the "irre-
sistible impetus" will then fall within the 
legal meaning of insanity as stated above. 
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Death is my arch enemy not only as 
a living creature but also as an anaesthe-
tist. My professional duties are to keep 
people alive during operations and to 
snatch them from the jaws of death by 
resuscitation and organised intensive care 
in the routine hospital service. The reader 
will quickly notice that the title of my 
paper is a variation on a popular catch-
phrase with half a line from "Hamlet" 
tagged on. My subjects are the modern 
controversy about resuscitation, the mc-
ment of death and transplantation of 
human vital organs: nowadays a person 
may, after death, still render a great ser-
vice to his fellow men on whom his viable 
organ/s could be grafted to improve their 
precarious health and to prolong their 
lives. 
Organ transplantation 
During the last few years, in many 
medical centres throughout the world, 
transplantation of human organs (mostly 
kidneys) from living people and from re-
cently dead patients has been carried out 
with a reasonable degree of success. My 
colleague and friend, Professor Henning 
Poulsen, visiting the Artificial Kidney Unit 
